Armenia’s parliamentary elections are taking place at a decisive moment for the country’s political future and regional orientation. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is seeking to preserve his hold on power amid growing domestic pressure, an increasingly organised opposition and intensifying geopolitical competition between Russia and the West.
The outcome of the vote could have far-reaching consequences not only for Armenia’s internal political stability, but also for the peace process with Azerbaijan, the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye, and Yerevan’s broader foreign policy course. Questions also remain over whether the opposition will recognise the results, whether street protests could follow and how Moscow might respond if the balance of power shifts further away from Russia.
Today, News.Az speaks with Hazel Çağan Elbir, a Turkish analyst and researcher at the Center for Eurasian Studie about the possible outcome of the elections, the prospects for forming a new government and the wider regional implications of the vote.
– Even if Pashinyan finishes first in the election, could he still lose his political dominance in parliament?
– Under Armenia’s electoral system, a party must secure a certain share of the vote to obtain an absolute majority in parliament. At the same time, the proportional representation mechanism allows parties that receive a smaller share of the vote to gain a certain number of parliamentary seats.
Against this background, even if Pashinyan’s party finishes first, the combined number of seats secured by opposition blocs could potentially create an effective counterbalance in parliament. Opinion polls indicate that Pashinyan’s support stands at approximately 32 percent, while the high number of undecided voters makes the post-election coalition dynamics difficult to predict.
In particular, if the Russia-leaning forces associated with Serzh Sargsyan, Robert Kocharyan and Samvel Karapetyan unite, Pashinyan may be forced to enter negotiations during the process of forming a government. At the same time, low voter turnout and Pashinyan’s previous experience of securing a majority under similar circumstances increase the likelihood that he will largely preserve his political advantage in parliament.
It would be premature to make a definitive assessment before the results of tomorrow’s election become clear. Nevertheless, the available data suggest that Pashinyan may come close to securing an absolute majority. This represents a critical threshold for Armenia’s internal political stability and could directly affect the geopolitical balance.
– Could the pro-Russian opposition obstruct the formation of the new government?
– Pro-Russian opposition forces have previously used similar obstruction tactics during political processes and possess the capacity to employ comparable strategies during the formation of a new government.
In particular, the open support that political figures such as Serzh Sargsyan, Robert Kocharyan and Samvel Karapetyan and his Strong Armenia party receive from Russia could cause delays in parliamentary votes and coalition negotiations. Considering that Russia actively uses economic restrictions and political pressure as instruments of influence, the opposition could attempt to mobilise these tools to complicate the formation of the government.
However, Armenia’s democratic institutions and the strong diplomatic and financial support Pashinyan receives from the West could limit the effectiveness of such obstruction.
Historical examples show that similar opposition efforts have generally remained short-lived and limited in scope. The government formation process will have to proceed within the legal framework, meaning that any attempts to obstruct it will also have to remain within the limits of the law. As a result, although the opposition possesses certain instruments of influence, Pashinyan’s anticipated electoral advantage and international support are expected to protect the government formation process to a considerable extent.
– How could the election result affect the course of peace negotiations with Azerbaijan?
– A strong electoral result for Pashinyan would mean the continuation of the current course in the peace negotiations with Azerbaijan.
The TRIPP agreement and Pashinyan’s related statements demonstrate that his government views the peace process with Azerbaijan as an independent foreign policy priority. This could ensure continuity in the negotiations and support further steps towards regional normalisation.
Pashinyan’s confirmation of his commitment to normalising relations between Türkiye and Armenia could also contribute to the establishment of a comprehensive environment of peace in the South Caucasus.
On the other hand, if the pro-Russian opposition gains strength, the risk of delays in the peace process or the emergence of new conditions could increase. Pashinyan’s foreign policy approach, which is focused on “peace and prosperity,” makes it more likely that an electoral victory would strengthen the foundation for reaching an agreement with Azerbaijan.
Overall, a clear result in Pashinyan’s favour is expected to have a positive impact on the negotiations, allowing the process to accelerate and move forward more consistently.
– Is it possible that the opposition in Armenia will refuse to recognise the election results and launch street protests?
– Armenia’s political history includes examples of opposition forces refusing to recognise election results and resorting to street protests. Therefore, a similar scenario remains possible.
In particular, the Russia-leaning political groups associated with Serzh Sargsyan, Robert Kocharyan and Samvel Karapetyan possess a certain level of support and have the organisational capacity to challenge the results and mobilise protests.
However, similar attempts during previous elections remained limited and failed to develop into movements enjoying broad public support. The high number of undecided voters and the lack of trust in opposition parties are among the factors that could prevent protests from becoming truly widespread.
Catholicos Karekin II’s call for citizens to participate in the elections may also influence public dynamics. Meanwhile, Pashinyan’s strong backing from the West could limit the international legitimacy of any protest campaign.
In conclusion, opposition attempts to challenge the results and organise protests are possible. However, the likelihood that these protests will become long-lasting or generate transformative political consequences appears limited.
– Could Moscow make a new attempt to intervene after the election in order to change the balance of power in Armenia in its favour?
– There is a strong possibility that Moscow will be dissatisfied with the election results and seek to alter the balance of power in Armenia in its favour.
The economic restrictions imposed by Moscow on Yerevan, threatening statements, including remarks by Sergei Shoigu and Vladimir Putin, and pressure within the Eurasian Economic Union demonstrate the range of instruments Russia can use. Similar methods can therefore be expected to continue in the post-election period.
Russia’s military presence in Gyumri and its other strategic positions provide Moscow with certain operational capabilities. However, the open and strong support offered by the West, particularly the United States and the European Union, significantly increases the potential cost of any such intervention.
The international partnerships developed by the Pashinyan government also make Moscow’s possible actions more difficult from both legal and diplomatic perspectives. Historical experience shows that similar Russian initiatives have previously encountered negative reactions across the region.
Ultimately, new attempts by Moscow to intervene remain possible. However, the existing geopolitical balance and Armenia’s domestic political dynamics are likely to limit the chances of such efforts succeeding. Russia’s involvement in the ongoing war also plays a major role in restricting its ability to intervene more extensively in Armenia.
