Speaking on the 72nd anniversary of the Sudanese Armed Forces, Burhan attempted to present two positions simultaneously. He said the army remains determined to fight and defeat the RSF, while insisting that this military objective does not mean credible peace initiatives will automatically be rejected.
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The distinction is important. Burhan is not proposing an unconditional ceasefire or negotiations between two politically equal armed actors. Instead, he is outlining a peace process that would fundamentally change the RSF’s military and political position before broader reconciliation takes place.
His stated sequence begins with RSF fighters laying down their weapons and assembling in designated locations. Security would then have to be restored, displaced civilians allowed to return to their homes, essential services re-established and monitoring mechanisms put in place.
Only after those measures, according to Burhan, could authorities consider what should happen to RSF members who were not implicated in crimes.
This means the army’s peace position is based primarily on disarmament rather than power-sharing.
The critical question is whether the RSF could accept a framework requiring it to surrender its principal source of leverage before negotiations determine its political future. If it refuses, Burhan’s peace offer may remain difficult to translate into a negotiated end to the fighting.
Why is Burhan demanding that the RSF lay down its weapons first?
Burhan’s demand reflects the army’s view that the RSF should no longer exist as an autonomous military force capable of competing with the Sudanese state.
The conflict itself emerged from a struggle over military authority, political power and the proposed integration of the RSF into Sudan’s regular armed forces.
Before the war, the RSF had developed into a powerful paramilitary organization with its own command structure, fighters, financial resources and territorial influence. That created an unusual situation in which Sudan effectively contained two major armed centers of power.
The fighting that erupted in April 2023 demonstrated how unstable that arrangement had become.
From the army’s perspective, ending the current war while preserving the RSF as an independent armed organization would leave the underlying cause of the conflict unresolved. A ceasefire might stop fighting temporarily without eliminating the possibility of another confrontation.
Burhan’s position therefore appears to be that Sudan can ultimately have only one national military structure.
Requiring RSF fighters to surrender their weapons and assemble in designated locations would remove the organization’s capacity to resume large-scale military operations independently.
It would also shift the balance of power decisively toward the army before political negotiations begin.
That is precisely why the condition is likely to be difficult for the RSF to accept.
Disarmament would mean surrendering the military leverage that allows the organization to negotiate from a position of strength.
The central obstacle is therefore straightforward: what the army considers an essential prerequisite for peace may be viewed by the RSF as effectively accepting defeat before negotiations begin.
Does Burhan’s proposal amount to a peace offer or a demand for RSF surrender?
It contains elements of both, depending on how the proposed sequence is interpreted.
Burhan says the army will consider genuine peace initiatives, which leaves open the possibility of negotiations and a political process.
However, the conditions he has outlined would require the RSF to take its most consequential step — disarmament — before its future status is fully determined.
That makes the proposal considerably different from a conventional peace negotiation in which two armed parties agree to a ceasefire and then negotiate disarmament, security arrangements and political participation.
Burhan explicitly rejects an agreement that would return RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti, his forces or their supporters to positions of power.
The army therefore appears to oppose a settlement based on restoring the pre-war balance between the two military centers.
From Khartoum’s perspective, that position can be presented as necessary to prevent another war.
From the RSF’s perspective, however, the terms could be interpreted as demanding military capitulation followed by negotiations over what protections or reintegration opportunities individual fighters might receive.
This distinction will be central to any mediation effort.
If disarmament must be completed before substantive negotiations, the chances of immediate agreement may be limited.
If the process can instead establish synchronized stages — ceasefire, withdrawal, assembly of forces, disarmament, monitoring and political dialogue — mediators may have more room to construct a compromise.
The language of peace therefore matters less than the sequencing of obligations that would turn it into reality.
What would happen to RSF fighters under Burhan’s proposed framework?
Burhan has indicated that the future of individual RSF fighters could be considered after disarmament and the restoration of basic security conditions.
Importantly, he distinguished between fighters who may have been involved in crimes and those who were not.
That suggests a possible pathway for at least some RSF personnel to return to civilian life or potentially be incorporated into future state arrangements.
But many questions remain unanswered.
Authorities would need a mechanism for determining which fighters were implicated in crimes and which were eligible for reintegration.
That would be an enormous undertaking after years of warfare involving widespread allegations of atrocities and serious violations by armed actors.
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration would also require substantial resources.
Tens of thousands of armed men cannot simply surrender their weapons without consideration of what happens afterward.
Former fighters may require employment, training, financial assistance or integration into legitimate security institutions.
Without such opportunities, demobilized combatants can join criminal networks, local militias or new armed movements.
Accountability creates another challenge.
A peace process designed solely to absorb combatants without addressing serious crimes could generate opposition from victims and affected communities.
Conversely, a system perceived by RSF fighters as indiscriminate punishment could discourage them from surrendering.
A sustainable process would therefore need to combine disarmament with individualized screening, accountability mechanisms and realistic reintegration options.
Burhan’s proposal establishes the broad principle that not every RSF fighter would necessarily face the same outcome. The difficult task would be transforming that principle into a credible and transparent system.
Why does Burhan reject a return of Hemedti and the RSF to political power?
Burhan’s position reflects the transformation of Sudan’s conflict from a dispute between security institutions into an existential struggle over control of the state.
Before the war, Burhan and Hemedti were both central figures in Sudan’s post-Omar al-Bashir political order.
Their forces initially cooperated during major political transitions before disagreements over military integration and the future distribution of power escalated.
Once open warfare began, the possibility of returning to the previous arrangement became increasingly remote.
After years of fighting, casualties, displacement and allegations of atrocities, the army now argues that restoring the RSF leadership to political authority would recreate the conditions that produced the conflict.
Burhan’s rejection of an “incomplete” settlement appears directed at peace proposals that might freeze the conflict while preserving the RSF as both a military and political actor.
The army wants a fundamentally different post-war order.
That would involve the regular military retaining institutional primacy while political structures are rebuilt without an independent RSF power center.
The difficulty is that Hemedti and the RSF have their own political ambitions and constituencies.
Any agreement that completely excludes one side risks being rejected by that side and could prolong the conflict.
Sudan therefore faces a familiar post-conflict dilemma: whether stability is better served by incorporating former adversaries into a political system or excluding actors considered responsible for undermining the state.
Burhan has clearly moved toward the second position regarding the RSF leadership.
Why is the return of displaced civilians central to the peace proposal?
The displacement crisis is one of the clearest measures of the war’s catastrophic impact.
Nearly 13 million people have been displaced during the conflict, including millions forced from their homes within Sudan and others who have fled to neighboring countries.
Burhan says civilians must be able to return as part of the process leading toward peace.
That requirement is significant because military ceasefires alone do not automatically create conditions for safe return.
Homes may have been destroyed or occupied. Neighborhoods can contain unexploded ordnance. Basic services may no longer function. Local security structures may have collapsed.
Returning civilians therefore requires more than an announcement that fighting has ended.
Authorities would need to restore policing, electricity, water supplies, healthcare, transportation and administrative services.
Property disputes could become another major problem.
After prolonged displacement, people returning home may discover that buildings or agricultural land are occupied by others.
Resolving such disputes peacefully requires functioning courts and local institutions.
There is also the question of voluntary return.
Displaced civilians should not be forced back to areas where they do not believe they are safe.
Burhan’s inclusion of civilian return therefore broadens the definition of peace beyond simply stopping battlefield operations.
For millions of Sudanese, the meaningful test of any agreement will be whether they can safely return home, rebuild their livelihoods and access essential services.
Without that, a formal peace agreement could coexist with an enormous unresolved humanitarian crisis.
What is Burhan’s proposed Sudanese-led national dialogue?
Alongside his military conditions, Burhan has outlined a separate political process intended to involve Sudanese political and social groups in rebuilding state institutions.
He says discussions have begun with national and sectoral groups that support the state and its institutions.
One objective is establishing a legislative council, which Burhan described as a constitutional requirement.
Sudan has lacked stable civilian political institutions throughout much of the turbulent period following the overthrow of longtime President Omar al-Bashir in 2019.
Creating a legislative body could therefore become an important part of rebuilding formal governance.
Burhan has also backed an initiative by Sudanese men and women calling for what he describes as a purely Sudanese dialogue.
The proposed process would bring together political and societal forces and focus on ending civilian suffering, establishing peace and creating broader national consensus.
Its organizers have proposed an independent national mechanism to prepare for comprehensive dialogue.
They requested state guarantees covering the security of participants as well as logistical, legal and political support.
Burhan says he has accepted those requests.
The initiative reflects a broader argument that Sudan’s future should ultimately be determined through negotiations among Sudanese rather than imposed by external powers.
However, its credibility will depend heavily on participation.
A national dialogue involving only forces aligned with the army would struggle to produce genuinely broad consensus. The central test will therefore be whether the process can include sufficiently diverse civilian and political constituencies while maintaining meaningful independence from military control.
Why have previous peace efforts failed to stop Sudan’s war?
Repeated diplomatic efforts have struggled because the conflict combines military rivalry, political competition, territorial control and deep distrust.
Ceasefire initiatives can temporarily reduce fighting, but enforcing them requires both sides to believe that compliance serves their interests.
That condition has repeatedly been difficult to achieve.
When armed groups believe they can improve their negotiating position through further battlefield gains, incentives to compromise weaken.
Another problem is disagreement over the objective of negotiations.
A temporary humanitarian ceasefire is fundamentally different from a comprehensive political settlement.
The former may establish corridors for aid or temporarily halt attacks. The latter must answer much harder questions: who controls the military, what happens to the RSF, how civilian government is restored, how crimes are addressed and how political power is distributed.
External involvement further complicates the conflict.
Sudan sits within a region where neighboring states and wider international powers have significant security, economic and geopolitical interests.
Different diplomatic initiatives can therefore overlap or compete.
Most importantly, neither side has historically trusted the other enough to surrender its principal military advantages without strong guarantees.
This is why Burhan’s latest position faces the same fundamental obstacle as previous proposals.
The army wants RSF disarmament to guarantee that the conflict cannot restart.
The RSF would require guarantees that disarmament would not simply leave its members politically excluded and militarily vulnerable.
Until mediators can bridge that security dilemma, declarations of willingness to pursue peace may remain difficult to translate into a durable settlement.
Could a purely Sudanese dialogue succeed without international mediation?
A Sudanese-led process could provide something external diplomacy often struggles to create: domestic political legitimacy.
Sudan’s crisis ultimately concerns the structure of the Sudanese state, so any durable settlement must be accepted by Sudanese political forces and society.
Local ownership is therefore essential.
However, a purely domestic process also faces significant limitations.
The country is deeply fragmented, millions of people are displaced and many political organizations operate under extremely difficult conditions.
Armed actors control territory and resources, while civilian groups do not possess comparable coercive power.
This creates a risk that a national dialogue could become dominated by whichever military actor holds the strongest position.
Independence is therefore critical.
If participants believe the mechanism is designed primarily to legitimize an army-led political order, important constituencies may refuse to participate.
International actors can still play useful supporting roles without dictating the political outcome.
They can provide humanitarian assistance, monitoring expertise, technical support for disarmament and guarantees connected to ceasefire implementation.
External actors can also help finance reconstruction and the reintegration of former combatants.
The most realistic model may therefore not be a choice between Sudanese ownership and international involvement.
Instead, Sudanese actors could control the substance of the political process while international partners provide monitoring, resources and guarantees where necessary.
The success of Burhan’s proposed dialogue will ultimately depend on whether it becomes genuinely inclusive rather than simply another political track operating alongside an unresolved military conflict.
What would a realistic path to peace in Sudan require?
A durable settlement would likely require several interconnected processes rather than one agreement.
The first priority would be reducing or stopping active fighting.
Without a credible ceasefire, humanitarian access and political dialogue remain vulnerable to battlefield developments.
The second challenge would be separating forces and establishing monitoring mechanisms capable of detecting violations.
RSF fighters could then assemble in designated locations as part of a phased disarmament process, provided credible guarantees exist concerning their treatment.
The future of individual combatants would need to be addressed through disarmament, demobilization, accountability and reintegration programs.
At the same time, civilians must be protected and humanitarian assistance expanded.
Displaced families need conditions that allow voluntary and safe return.
Political negotiations would then have to confront the fundamental question that helped produce the war: who controls armed force in Sudan?
A sustainable state cannot indefinitely contain competing national armies with separate command structures.
But resolving that problem requires legitimate civilian institutions capable of exercising authority over the security sector.
Accountability must also be addressed. Serious crimes committed during the conflict cannot simply disappear from the political agenda once a ceasefire is signed.
Finally, reconstruction will require enormous financial resources.
Burhan’s latest remarks indicate that the army accepts peace in principle but defines it around RSF disarmament and the restoration of state authority.
Whether that becomes the beginning of a settlement or another rejected proposal will depend on whether a formula can be found that ends the RSF’s independent military role without making negotiations indistinguishable from unconditional surrender.
