Deportation, ‘international wanted list’ mark new escalation in Baku-Moscow tensions

This article was originally published on JAMnews.
Two developments on 17 August highlighted the continuing fragility of relations between Baku and Moscow. Russia deported Bakhtiyar Hasanov, chairman of the Azerbaijani National-Cultural Autonomy in Moscow, to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan, in turn, placed three Russian citizens on an international wanted list: Moscow 24 TV presenter Ivan Knyazev, political consultant and media expert Semyon Uralov, and journalist and adviser to the Russian transport minister Alexei Chadayev.
The fact that the two developments occurred on the same day may at first suggest that they were reciprocal measures. However, the process that culminated in Hasanov’s deportation had begun well before 17 August, with his case under consideration for at least several months. Therefore, while there is no public evidence of a direct causal link between the two decisions, both developments fit into the broader pattern of the prolonged deterioration in Azerbaijani-Russian relations.
Deportation of Bakhtiyar Hasanov
According to open sources, Bakhtiyar Hasanov was detained in Russia in June 2026 and placed in a temporary detention centre for foreign nationals. He appealed against the decision to deport him, but the court rejected his appeal.
According to sources, Hasanov’s Russian citizenship was revoked in September 2025. In autumn 2025, the Agentstvo media outlet established that Hasanov’s passport, issued in 2019, was listed as invalid in a Russian government database. Hasanov himself denied at the time that he had been stripped of his citizenship.
One of the key questions is the legal basis on which his citizenship was revoked. Open sources provide no complete or unequivocal explanation for the decision.
The case also carries political significance because of Hasanov’s status. For many years, he cooperated with official Moscow bodies dealing with diaspora and interethnic relations and served on public councils. His deportation is therefore also being viewed as part of a broader trend of pressure on the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia.
Growing pressure on the diaspora
Since the summer of 2025, several prominent members of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia have been stripped of their citizenship, detained or expelled from the country. The names of Arshad Khankishiyev, Elshan Ibrahimov and Javid Rzayev have been mentioned in this context.
Russian nationalist and Kremlin-aligned media have largely portrayed these measures as part of efforts to combat illegal migration, alleged links to criminal groups and security concerns. However, final court rulings on all the allegations made against these individuals are not publicly available.
This process took on a more overtly political dimension following an operation targeting Azerbaijani families in Yekaterinburg in June 2025. The deaths of the Safarov brothers during the operation prompted a sharp reaction from Baku. Moscow linked the operation to an investigation into crimes committed many years earlier, while the Azerbaijani side focused on reports of violence and torture against those detained.
Since then, the issue of the diaspora has gradually moved beyond the social and cultural sphere and become one of the instruments of political pressure in relations between the two countries.
Baku’s charges against three Russian citizens
On 17 August, Azerbaijan’s Prosecutor General’s Office said that Ivan Knyazev, Semyon Uralov and Alexei Chadayev had been placed on a wanted list as part of a criminal investigation.
The investigation relates to programmes published on Uralov’s YouTube channel on 14 July and 13 August. According to the Azerbaijani authorities, the broadcasts contained calls for the violent overthrow of the country’s constitutional order, violations of its territorial integrity, terrorist activity and incitement of ethnic hatred.
The criminal case is being investigated under Articles 214-2, 281.2 and 283.2.1 of Azerbaijan’s Criminal Code. A court ordered the three men to be detained in absentia.
Excerpts from the broadcasts published by Azerbaijani media include remarks about a possible military operation against Baku, military pressure on Azerbaijan from the Caspian Sea and the use of physical violence against the country’s leadership. However, the Prosecutor General’s Office has not published full transcripts of the broadcasts, expert assessments or all the episodes on which the charges are based.
What do Uralov and Chadayev say?
The accused reject Baku’s allegations. Alexei Chadayev denied inciting ethnic hatred, saying that his criticism was directed not against the Azerbaijani people but against the country’s political leadership.
Semyon Uralov, for his part, described the Azerbaijani authorities’ decision as politically motivated. In subsequent Telegram posts, he continued to sharply criticise the political systems of post-Soviet countries, including the Azerbaijani authorities.
The response indicates that the case has moved beyond the legal sphere and become part of the broader information confrontation between the two countries.
‘International wanted list’ does not mean automatic arrest
The term “international wanted list”, used by Azerbaijani media, does not mean that a wanted person will automatically be arrested in another country.
Even if Interpol issues a Red Notice, it does not constitute an international arrest warrant. Each country decides whether to detain a wanted person in accordance with its own laws. In addition, Interpol’s constitution prohibits the organisation from intervening in matters of a political, military, religious or racial character.
The outcome of Baku’s request will therefore depend on the legal evidence submitted, as well as on how other countries assess the case — as a criminal prosecution or as a continuation of the political confrontation.
Ukraine factor
The latest escalation in Azerbaijani-Russian relations comes against the backdrop of the growing prominence of the Ukraine issue.
On 6 August, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov made his first official visit to Kyiv since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and visited Irpin. Azerbaijan reiterated its support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. The two sides also discussed the possibility of supplying Azerbaijani gas to Ukraine.
Against this political backdrop, former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko visited Baku on 16–17 August and met Ilham Aliyev. The presentation to Aliyev of a certificate naming him an honorary citizen of Irpin could be perceived in Moscow as a symbolic political gesture.
There is no evidence confirming a direct link between these developments and Hasanov’s deportation. However, the Azerbaijani leadership’s increasingly open articulation of a position on Ukraine that differs from Moscow’s fits into the broader picture of growing discontent in Russian political circles.
New mechanisms of mutual pressure
One notable change in relations between Baku and Moscow over the past two years has been the increasingly active use of law-enforcement and administrative mechanisms in the context of their political confrontation.
Russia has applied citizenship and migration laws, as well as criminal legislation, against members of the Azerbaijani diaspora. Azerbaijan, in turn, has used criminal prosecution mechanisms against individuals linked to Russian media over statements that Baku regards as posing a threat to the country.
This does not in itself mean that the legal arguments put forward by either side are unfounded. However, the fact that such legal measures are being taken against the backdrop of political crises in bilateral relations inevitably raises questions about their selective application and possible use for political purposes.
Where are relations heading?
At this stage, a complete political rupture between Azerbaijan and Russia appears unlikely. The two countries have significant mutual interests in areas including trade, transport, logistics and regional security.
At the same time, a return to the previous level of relations also appears difficult. Instead, an emerging model seems to be characterised by political mistrust alongside continued, limited cooperation.
Azerbaijanis living in Russia, as well as diaspora organisations maintaining social ties between the two countries, could find themselves particularly vulnerable in this confrontation. The use of diaspora representatives as instruments in an interstate dispute, particularly when accompanied by ethnic rhetoric, increases the risk that tensions could extend beyond diplomatic relations and affect relations between the two societies.
The events of 17 August therefore have broader significance than two separate legal decisions. They point to the emergence of a new model of relations in which Baku and Moscow, while continuing to cooperate, are increasingly making use of political and legal means to exert pressure on one another.