Despite Ankara’s formal stance and its miscalculated approach towards Jerusalem, third-party states continue to supply the country with Israeli-made goods. After imposing a so-called embargo on exports to and imports from Israel, it is reported that the Jewish state imported $924 million worth of goods from Turkey in 2025, defying the official rhetoric of the AKP-led Turkish government, which has now made Israel public enemy number one. Conversely, Israeli exports to Turkey amounted to nearly $11 million, after experiencing a freefall from $598.6 million in 2024. In addition to these relatively positive trade and economic ties, political relations have plummeted to an all-time low due to disagreements over the future of Gaza and Syria, where the state interests of the two regional powers intersect in opposite directions. To satisfy Turkey’s domestic audience, President Erdoğan has reportedly used third-party states such as Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Georgia, and Azerbaijan to import essential Israeli products, thereby adding logistical costs, while simultaneously pressuring Azerbaijan to cut off all trading ties in the energy and defence sectors. Such hawkish policies imposed by Turkey have not gone down well in Baku, given Azerbaijan’s staunchly held principle of neutrality in international affairs. Nevertheless, the Azerbaijan–Israel alliance has continued to develop in good faith and with reliability, marked by ministerial visits, including Azerbaijani Minister of Defence Zakir Hasanov’s visit to Tel Aviv and Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s visit to Baku.
From the red line over Syria to “secretive” trade relations, Ankara’s prudence on the Palestinian issue has become way too costly to maintain for several reasons.
- The entirety of the Arab World no longer sees “the Palestinian issue” as an Arab cause.
- The Muslim World enjoys having economic relations with Jerusalem, particularly Azerbaijan, the UAE, Kazakhstan and Morocco.
- Turkey’s refusal to communicate directly with its Israeli counterparts only leads to miscommunication and erosion of influence in the aftermath of the Gaza War.
Generally, the neo-Ottoman foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey, aimed at asserting influence across the MENA region, has backfired in numerous cases. It is not unreasonable for Ankara to insist on a future role in Gaza or elsewhere, particularly in light of statements by the Israeli government, which has articulated a clear objective of disarming Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups.
The trajectory of Israel–Turkey relations suggests that another reconciliation may emerge in the interest of both countries’ security, recalling the warmer ties enjoyed during the informal alignment between the governments of David Ben-Gurion and Adnan Menderes. However, developments in Iran and the upcoming Turkish elections may prove detrimental to such a rapprochement.
The region may either witness competitive alignment between two blocs, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar on one side, and Israel, the UAE, and Ethiopia on the other, competing for regional dominance, or move towards an American-managed regional order in which major powers coordinate security arrangements concerning Syria, Iraq, and Iran with like-minded partners.
Author: Farid Shukurlu
