However, claims that the United States is building an entirely new military base near Cuba have not been confirmed. The issue primarily concerns the reinforcement of the existing Guantanamo Bay naval base, located in southeastern Cuba, as well as heightened readiness among US forces across the Caribbean.
Guantanamo Bay remains one of the most sensitive issues in relations between Washington and Havana. The American base covers approximately 117 square kilometres and has existed for more than a century. The United States justifies its presence through agreements concluded in the early twentieth century, while the Cuban government considers those agreements to have been imposed and continues to demand the return of the territory.
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The current escalation did not begin with the construction of a new base, but rather with a noticeable increase in US activity around the existing facility.
On May 29, 2026, General Francis Donovan, head of the US Southern Command, held a rare meeting with senior Cuban military officials along the boundary separating the Guantanamo Bay base from the rest of Cuba. The Cuban delegation included General Roberto Legrá Sotolongo, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Revolutionary Armed Forces.
Photo: CNN
According to the US side, the talks focused on perimeter security, the protection of military personnel and their families, and the operational readiness of the base. Donovan also personally reviewed the facility’s security arrangements.
A meeting between the head of US Southern Command and senior Cuban military representatives is highly unusual. Both sides described the talks positively and agreed to maintain a direct communication channel in order to prevent incidents around Guantanamo Bay.
The meeting points to two parallel trends. On the one hand, Washington is taking the security of the base seriously and preparing for a possible deterioration in the regional situation. On the other, the US and Cuban militaries are still attempting to prevent an accidental escalation that could result in an armed confrontation.
Tensions increased further after reports appeared in the US media claiming that Cuba had acquired more than 300 military drones from Russia and Iran. According to American sources, the Cuban military may have discussed the possible use of drones against the Guantanamo Bay base, US naval vessels, and even targets near Key West, Florida, located roughly 145 kilometres from Cuba.
Photo: CNN
At the same time, US officials have acknowledged that there is currently no immediate threat of an attack. Available intelligence reportedly indicates only that Cuban military officials may have discussed possible scenarios in the event of hostilities with the United States.
Havana has categorically rejected the allegations. The Cuban leadership views reports about potential drone attacks as part of an information campaign intended to create a pretext for additional pressure or even a military operation.
Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel warned that any US military action against the island could lead to large-scale bloodshed and seriously destabilise the entire Caribbean region. He said Cuba posed no threat to the United States but reserved the right to defend its territory and sovereignty.
Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez also accused Washington of fabricating accusations. Havana fears that the United States is seeking to use the country’s economic crisis, fuel shortages, and public discontent to bring about political change.
These concerns intensified following a rare visit to Havana by CIA Director John Ratcliffe in May. The American side said he warned the Cuban leadership against hostile actions and conveyed the position of President Donald Trump: Washington would be prepared to engage only if Cuba introduced fundamental changes to its domestic and foreign policies.
The United States is therefore using several instruments of pressure at the same time, including sanctions, energy restrictions, intelligence activity, legal measures against Cuban officials, and demonstrations of military readiness.
American concerns are connected not only to Cuba itself, but also to the alleged expansion of Russian and Chinese intelligence activity on the island.
According to US sources, Moscow and Beijing may have increased the number of intelligence personnel operating in Cuba since 2023 and modernised electronic surveillance facilities. Such installations could potentially monitor American military bases in Florida, the Kennedy Space Center, US Southern Command facilities, and naval movements throughout the Caribbean.
Cuba’s geographical position gives these claims particular significance. The island lies only around 145 kilometres from Florida. Equipment deployed there could potentially collect signals intelligence, monitor military communications, and observe the activities of the US armed forces.
China and Cuba reject claims that a Chinese intelligence base exists on the island. Beijing has accused Washington of spreading false information and using security concerns to justify sanctions and interference in Cuba’s domestic affairs.
China’s response has generally remained cautious. Beijing supports the lifting of the US embargo, calls for respect for Cuban sovereignty, and continues to expand economic ties with Havana. However, China has so far shown no willingness to become directly involved in a possible military confrontation between Cuba and the United States.
For Beijing, Cuba has strategic importance. A presence on the island allows China to exert political and psychological pressure on Washington close to US territory. In some respects, Cuba can be viewed as a counterweight to American military infrastructure surrounding China, including bases and deployments in Japan, South Korea, Guam, and the Philippines.
Russia has taken a more openly supportive position toward Havana. Moscow traditionally condemns US sanctions and describes them as an attempt to suffocate the Cuban economy. Russian officials have repeatedly stressed Cuba’s right to determine its own domestic and foreign policy.
Russia also maintains military cooperation with Cuba. In June 2024, a group of Russian warships entered Havana harbour, including the frigate Admiral Gorshkov and the nuclear-powered submarine Kazan. Although Moscow and Havana said the visit posed no threat, it was widely interpreted as a demonstration of Russia’s ability to project military power close to the US coastline.
Nevertheless, there is no confirmed evidence that Russia is preparing to establish a full-scale military base in Cuba or deploy offensive missile systems there. Russian support for Havana currently consists mainly of diplomatic backing, energy cooperation, fuel supplies, and security ties.
Moscow understands that the permanent deployment of major military forces in Cuba would provoke an extremely harsh response from the United States. Such a move would inevitably evoke direct historical comparisons with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles brought the Soviet Union and the United States close to nuclear war.
The current situation still differs considerably from the events of 1962. There is no confirmed evidence that Russian or Chinese nuclear weapons have been deployed in Cuba. The United States has not announced preparations for an invasion, and the two countries’ militaries continue to maintain communication on security issues around Guantanamo Bay.
The danger, however, lies in the gradual accumulation of risk factors.
The United States is increasing pressure on the Cuban leadership and views Havana’s cooperation with Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran as a threat to national security. Cuba, for its part, fears a US-led operation aimed at changing the government and is strengthening its defence relationships with Washington’s main rivals. Russia and China are using the situation to challenge US influence, although both are still avoiding direct military confrontation.
Even if none of the parties intends to start a war, one could still be triggered by the misinterpretation of intelligence, the flight of a drone, the appearance of a military vessel, an alert along the Guantanamo perimeter, or an unverified report about an imminent attack.
The reinforcement of Guantanamo Bay should therefore be viewed not as an isolated infrastructure project, but as part of a broader US strategy in the Western Hemisphere. Washington is seeking to limit the influence of Russia, China, and Iran in the Caribbean and Latin America, regarding their presence as an intrusion by strategic competitors into an area directly connected to US security.
What is happening around Cuba is therefore not so much a repetition of the Cuban Missile Crisis as a new form of great-power competition. In 1962, the central issue was nuclear missiles. Today, the main instruments are drones, electronic intelligence, sanctions, energy pressure, cyber operations, and demonstrations of naval power.
At present, it would be premature to say that the United States is building a new military base near Cuba. A more accurate assessment is that Washington is strengthening the existing Guantanamo Bay facility, raising the readiness of its forces, and closely monitoring Cuba’s cooperation with Russia, China, and Iran.
Havana sees these actions as preparation for possible aggression. Moscow is demonstrating political support for Cuba and a willingness to preserve its strategic presence in the region. Beijing is defending the island’s right to sovereign development while rejecting allegations that it is building intelligence infrastructure there.
For now, all sides are avoiding a transition to open conflict. Nevertheless, the Caribbean is once again becoming an arena of competition among major powers, where even a limited military incident could have consequences extending far beyond Cuba.
By Tural Heybatov
