The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) between India and Pakistan is at a crossroads. The treaty has been held in “abeyance” by India since 2025, a status that is not recognised in international law, and India is actively opposing participation in the arbitration that is currently taking place at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague. India’s discontent with the treaty is not new.
India sent notices to Pakistan seeking a modification of the treaty, and Prime Minister Modi had earlier remarked that “blood and water cannot flow together.” Pakistan has throughout maintained that the treaty itself remains a working mechanism for resolving any issue that arises.
India wants more control over the waters of the Indus basin, which was divided into three eastern rivers and three western rivers, with the latter going to Pakistan. India is permitted to construct run-of-river projects on the western rivers, subject to certain limitations; and where a dispute arises, the treaty is equipped to handle it.
Under Article VIII of the treaty, the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) was set up with one Commissioner from each country, for cooperation and addressing any arising “questions”. In addition, it laid out two avenues, one a Neutral Expert to resolve technical “differences” and another a Court of Arbitration to resolve legal “disputes”. All of these have been employed by both states at different points to work through their issues.
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The current point of contention began in 2016, when Pakistan objected to the design of two dams India was building on the western rivers: Kishenganga, on a tributary of the Jhelum, and Ratle, on the Chenab. Pakistan sought a Court of Arbitration, whereas India sought a Neutral Expert, arguing the questions were technical, and the deadlock was initiated. Pakistan considered the matter to be legal and interpretive and thus within the jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration, while India argued it was a technical issue that should be addressed by the Neutral Expert.
Both sides remained stalemated for almost six years, until 2022, when the World Bank, whose role under the treaty is to appoint these forums, simultaneously initiated both processes. The Court of Arbitration ruled itself competent to hear the case, and the proceedings started. India boycotted them, declaring that the court was illegally constituted. Pakistan took part. From then it escalated. India issued notices, threatened to cut off the water, and ultimately found its opening after the tragic attack at Pahalgam, which it blamed on Pakistan without any evidence, and placed the treaty in abeyance.
The Court of Arbitration on 27 June 2025 unanimously decided that India’s “abeyance” has no impact on its competence and that the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be revoked by a unilateral action once proceedings have commenced. The court continued its business. It issued another award on 15 May 2026 confirming Pakistan’s position that the treaty imposes real limits on India’s control of the western rivers, at the design stage. Both were rejected by India as it declared the court illegal and the awards as null and void.
It is a fact that a court decides its own jurisdiction, just like the Court of Arbitration did. If any state could dissolve a court by simply declaring it is illegal, then no international tribunals would be able to operate, since each losing side would do the same. India signed off on this court in 1960 and cannot walk away from it because it can see its case collapsing. India has not stopped at rejecting the court; it has begun acting on the rivers that belong to Pakistan.
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India has fast-tracked a group of hydropower projects on the western rivers, most of them on the Chenab. India has also called for tenders for the Chenab-Beas Link Tunnel, a project intended to divert the water of the Chenab out of the Pakistani rivers and into the Indian rivers, and expressly prohibited by the treaty. These projects would create for India a level of storage and control over the rivers of Pakistan that the Indus Waters Treaty prevented.
The concern is not only their number but their combined effect; more dams mean more capacity to hold, release, and time the water. The danger is no longer hypothetical. In December 2025, India released about 58,000 cusecs at Head Marala and then abruptly reduced the flow a few days later. For Pakistan, where the Chenab feeds farmland that millions depend on, this threatens food, livelihoods, and overall survival downstream.
The final awards are yet to come, but so far the awards of the Court of Arbitration have affirmed Pakistan’s position, as India continues to disregard its obligations. None of this is happening in a legal vacuum. India is rejecting the very mechanism it agreed to. The treaty has been in force for more than 60 years, through both peace and war. Now the challenge is whether common sense will prevail and India will return to the treaty it once believed in, or whether it will allow a system that has kept the peace over shared waters for six decades to slip away.
